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LOS ANGELES COUNTY TRANSPOR4 TION
COMMISSION v. RICHMOND. TAKING THE
INITIATIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
In what has been called the "Great Property Tax Revolt,"' "The
Great California Tax Revolt,"2 and "The Great California Tax-
quake,' 3 Proposition 13, entitled "A Tax Reform Measure" on the bal-
lot, passed with 64.8% voter approval on June 6, 19784 to become
Article XIII A of the California Constitution. Prior to the passage of
Proposition 13, California property tax had been levied on an ad
valorem basis.' Under this system, the state legislature established the
maximum tax rate6 and the county assessors determined the value of
the property. Proposition 13 radically altered this method of taxation,
substituting an "acquisition value system"' for the ad valorem system,
as well as limiting the tax rate which could be applied to real property.
Proposition 13 contains four substantive sections.9 Sections 1 and
2 taken together impose limitations on property taxes by decreasing
both the tax rate and the assessment base to which it is applied. Sec-
tion 1, while maintaining an ad valorem tax, requires that the tax rate
be a maximum of 1% of the full cash value of the property.'0 Previ-
1. Keppel, Property Taxes and the Revolt, L.A. Times, May 9, 1978, § II, at I, col. 2.
2. A Breiving Tax Revolt, NEWSWEEK, June 5, 1978, at 24.
3. Quirt,Aftershocks from the Great California Taxquake, FORTUNE, Sept. 25, 1978, at
74-75.
4. CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE 39 (June 1978).
5. Ad valorem taxes are taxes which are levied in proportion to the value of the taxable
item.
6. Seegenerally K. EHRMAN & S. FLAVIN, TAXING CALIFORNIA PROPERTY 3-25 (2d ed.
1979 & Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as EHRMAN & FLAVIN] (discussion of California prop-
erty taxation 1849 to present).
7. The amount of the property tax bill was derived by multiplying the assessed valua-
tion of the property by the tax rate.
8. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.
3d 208, 235, 583 P.2d 1281, 1293, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 251 (1978). The "acquisition value
system" sets as the tax base of the property the value of the property when it was acquired.
EHRMAN & FLAVIN, supra note 6, at 41.
9. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A has six sections. Sections 1 through 4, the substantive sec-
tions, are discussed in the text; section 5 sets forth the effective date of Proposition 13 and
section 6 is a severability clause.
10. Article XIII A states in part:
Section 1. (a) The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real property
shall not exceed one percent (1%) of the full cash value of such property. The one
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ously, the average property tax rate had been 2.5%." Section 2 pro-
vides that the base to which the tax rate shall be applied is the assessed
valuation shown on the 1975-76 tax bill or, in the case of a subsequent
transfer, the market value at the time of the transfer, with a 2% increase
in value allowed each year for inflation.' 2 Prior to the passage of Prop-
osition 13, property had been reassessed periodically to reflect current
market values. 13 Section 2 ended this practice. The immediate effect of
sections 1 and 2 was to slash approximately $7 billion from California
property tax revenues, a 57% reduction. 4
Proposition 13, however, was not limited to property tax reduction.
Sections 3 and 4 complement the first two sections by curtailing the
taxing powers of the state legislature and local entities, as well as
prohibiting the levy of additional ad valorem taxes or sales taxes on
real property. Section 3 requires a two-thirds vote approval in the leg-
percent (1%) tax to be collected by the counties and apportioned according to law
to the districts within the counties.
(b) The limitation provided for in subdivision (a) shall not apply to ad
valorem taxes or special assessments to pay the interest and redemption charges on
any indebtedness approved by the voters prior to the time this section becomes
effective.
CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § I.
11. Oakland, Proposition 13: Genesis and Consequences, in THE PROPERTY TAX REVOLT
31 (G. Kaufman & K. Rosen eds. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Oakland].
12. Article XIII A states in part:
Section 2. (a) The full cash value means the county assessor's valuation of
real property as shown on the 1975-76 tax bill under "full cash value" or, thereaf-
ter, the appraised value of real property when purchased, newly constructed, or a
change in ownership has occurred after the 1975 assessment. All real property not
already assessed up to the 1975-76 full cash value may be reassessed to reflect that
valuation.
(b) The full cash value base may reflect from year to year the inflationary
rate not to exceed 2 percent for any given year or reduction as shown in the con-
sumer price index or comparable data for the area under taxing jurisdiction.
CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 2.
13. The practice of reassessing property to maintain the 25% assessed valuation ratio as
market values rose was mandated by the Assessment Reform Act, CAL. A.B. 80, Ist Extra.
Sess., § 34 (1966), 1966 Cal. Stat. 648, 658 (codified as amended at CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§ 401 (West 1970)).
14. Oakland, supra note 11, at 32. This reduction resulted in a $3.6 billion benefit to
owners of business property and a $2 billion benefit to homeowners (Kuttner & Kelston, The
Shifting Property Tax Burden, 2 PUBLIC POLICY REPORT 13 (Conference on Alternative
State and Local Policies 1979)) as local governments-cities, counties and districts-lost
37% of their total incomes. Oakland, supra note 11, at 32. Before the effective date of Prop-
osition 13, property tax revenues had represented approximately 21.8% of cities' total reve-
nue and 34.6% of counties' total revenue. See CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, ANALYSIS OF
THE EFFECT OF PROPOSITION 13 ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 7 (1979). It is interesting to note
that some cities did not levy any property tax while some special districts relied entirely on
the property tax. See CAL. ASSEMBLY REV. & TAX. COMM., No-PROPERTY-TAX CITIES
AFTER PROPOSITION 13 4-6 (1980).
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islature for any increase in state taxes.15 Section 4 requires that cities,
counties, and special districts obtain two-thirds voter approval within
the locality before imposing special taxes. 6
The nature of the relationship of sections 3 and 4 to the entire
amendment, however, is unclear. Sections 3 and 4 may constitute a
mechanism to prevent property tax savings gained under sections 1 and
2 from being lost to increases in other taxes imposed by local govern-
ments in an effort to replace revenues lost because of Proposition 13.17
Alternatively, sections 3 and 4 may represent tax limitations upon all
non-property taxes, designed to work in conjunction with the 1% limi-
tation on property taxes, to achieve broad, overall tax relief.' 8 The lat-
ter view does not contemplate any direct relationship between lost
property tax revenues and the proposed new taxes. This distinction,
which is critical to an interpretation of section 4, will be discussed in
greater depth subsequently.' 9
Legal challenges to the initiative followed immediately upon its
passage. The first of these to be judicially resolved resulted in the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's initial pronouncement on the constitutionality
of the new amendment. In Amador Valley Joint Union High School
District v. State Board of Equalization,2° Proposition 13 withstood at-
tacks on its validity as a whole.2' The court, however, specifically re-
15. Article XIII A provides in part:
Section 3. From and after the effective date of this article, any changes in
State taxes enacted for the purpose of increasing revenues collected pursuant
thereto whether by increased rates or changes in methods of computation must be
imposed by an Act passed by not less than two-thirds of all members elected to
each of the two houses of the Legislature, except that no new ad valorem taxes on
real property, or sales or transaction taxes on the sale of real property may be
imposed.
CAL. CONsT. art. XIII A, § 3.
16. Article XIII A provides in part:
Section 4. Cities, counties and special districts, by a two-thirds vote of the
qualified electors of such district, may impose special taxes on such district, except
ad valorem taxes on real property or a transaction tax or sales tax on the sale of
real property within such City, County or special district.
CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 4.
17. See, e.g., Caifornia: Taxpayers'Revolt, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 6, 1978, at 30 ("[Proposi-
tion 13 would make] it more difficult to impose other state or local taxes to replace the lost
revenues."); L.A. Times, Apr. 23, 1978, § II, at 1, col. 2 ("Part 2 of their control is supposed
to assure that government cannot easily replace the lost property tax revenue by raising taxes
everywhere else.").
18. See, e.g., Quirt, supra note 3, at 75 ("John J. Klee, Jr., an assistant attorney general,
argued before the court that all of [Proposition] 13's provisions relate to 'the common pur-
pose of lowering taxes.' ").
19. See infra notes 71-74, 134-39, 157-67 and accompanying text.
20. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
21. "[W]e have concluded that article XIII A survives each of the substantial challenges
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served "'analysis of the problems which may arise respecting the
interpretation or application of particular provisions of the [article]
. . . for future cases in which those provisions are more directly
challenged.' "22
Three years later, the problem of the proper interpretation of sec-
tion 4 reached the supreme court. Los Angeles County Transportation
Commission v. Richmond23 posed a direct challenge to section 4, which
provides that "[c]ities, counties and special districts, by a two-third vote
... , may impose special taxes."24 In a plurality decision,2" the court
held that the term "special districts," as used in section 4, referred only
to those districts empowered to levy a tax on real property.26 The effect
of the court's definition was to narrow the application of section 4, con-
sistent with previous decisions which had limited the reach of Proposi-
tion 13.27 The rule of strict construction adopted in Richmond,
raised by petitioners." Id at 248, 583 P.2d at 1302, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 259. Proposition 13
was challenged as being a revision rather than an amendment to the California Constitution,
id at 221, 583 P.2d at 1284, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 242; as containing more than one subject, id at
229, 583 P.2d at 1289, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 247; as violative of equal protection, id at 232, 583
P.2d at 1292, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 250; as interfering with the constitutional right to travel, id at
237, 583 P.2d at 1295, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 253; as impairing contracts, id at 238, 583 P.2d at
1295, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 253; as having a misleading title and summary, id at 242, 583 P.2d at
1298, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 256; and as unconstitutionally vague, id at 244, 583 P.2d at 1299, 149
Cal. Rptr. at 257.
22. Id. at 219, 583 P.2d at 1283, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 241 (quoting County of Nevada v.
MacMillen, I 1 Cal. 3d 662, 666, 552 P.2d 1345, 1347, 114 Cal. Rptr. 345, 347 (1974)). Subse-
quent cases that have construed Proposition 13 include Carman v. Alvord, 31 Cal. 3d 318,
644 P.2d 192, 182 Cal. Rptr. 506 (1982) (construing the term indebtedness in section 1);
Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan, 27 Cal. 3d 855, 616 P.2d 802, 167 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1980)
(construing date on which property tax rollback effective in section 1), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
918 (1981); Los Angeles County Transp. Comm'n v. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d 197, 643 P.2d
941, 182 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1982) (construing "special districts" in section 4); City and County
of San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d 47, 648 P.2d 935, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1982) (constru-
ing "special taxes" in section 4).
23. 31 Cal. 3d 197, 643 P.2d 941, 182 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1982).
24. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 4. See also 31 Cal. 3d at 201, 643 P.2d at 943, 182 Cal.
Rptr. at 326.
25. The court vote split 5 - I on the interpretation of "special districts." Justice Richard-
son was the only dissenter. Justice Mosk, joined by Chief Justice Bird and Justice Brous-
sard, used a rule of strict construction to reach his conclusion. See infra note 103 and
accompanying text. The concurring justices, Justice Kaus and Justice Newman, did not
address the rule of construction to be applied but agreed with the plurality on the interpreta-
tion of "special district." See infra note 126 and accompanying text. Justice Richardson
reached his conclusion with a rule of liberal construction. See infra notes 118-19 and accom-
panying text.
26. 31 Cal. 3d at 205, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
27. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan, 27 Cal. 3d 855, 616 P.2d 802, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 820 (1980) (delaying Proposition 13's effective date as to specific type of property,
court used a rule of harmonization of differing parts of the California Constitution, as op-
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however, represents an apparent departure from the rule of liberal con-
struction traditionally applied to direct legislation.28
Initially, this Note analyzes the court's interpretation of section 4
itself. It then examines the California initiative process, the two-thirds
vote requirement, and the doctrine of local control as possible justifica-
tions for the court's departure from the rule of liberal construction for
the interpretation of initiatives.
The Richmond court, based on its interpretation of section 4 alone,
could have limited its ruling to a holding that a two-thirds vote require-
ment is applicable whenever a locality attempts to levy a tax to replace
lost property tax revenues. This result would not mandate a rule of
strict construction. Nonetheless, a rule of strict construction has been
established as a precedent for subsequent section 4 interpretations of
"special taxes."2 9  I
While neither the facts of Richmond nor the court's arguments
support the application of a rule of strict interpretation to all future
initiatives, the decision represents an incursion into the rule of liberal
construction of initiatives. Indeed, the primary significance of Rich-
mond lies in its implications concerning the proper role of the courts in
interpreting direct legislation by the voters.30 As a result, it will be eas-
ier to impose a rule of strict construction on future initiative
interpretations.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Section 130350 of the California Public Utilities Code,3 1 enacted
posed to either a rule of strict or liberal interpretation). While a taxpayer may regard any-
thing paid to the government as tax, the courts of appeal have limited the charges which
come within the ambit of Proposition 13. See Solvang Mun. Improvement Dist. v. Board of
Supervisors, 112 Cal. App. 3d 545, 169 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1980) (special assessment is a charge
on property to compel payment for the benefit to a particular property and is not a tax in the
constitutional sense); Mills v. County of Trinity, 108 Cal. App. 3d 656, 166 Cal. Rptr. 674
(1980) (fee is not a "special tax" within section 4; no rule of construction adopted); County
of Fresno v. Malmstrom, 94 Cal. App. 3d 974, 156 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1979) (special assessment
is not a "special tax" within section 4; no rule of construction adopted).
28. See 22 Cal. 3d at 219, 583 P.2d at 1283, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 241 (" '[T]he power of the
initiative must be liberally construed . . . to promote the democratic process.'" (quoting
San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 210 n.3, 529 P.2d 570,
572 n.3, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148 (1974))). See also infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
29. After the Richmond case, the court used a rule of strict construction without discus-
sion of the voters' intent in City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d 47, 648
P.2d 935, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1982), to reach an interpretation of the term "special taxes" in
section 4. See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 210-31 and accompanying text.
31. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 130350 states:
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in 1976, authorizes the Los Angeles County Transportation Commis-
sion (LACTC)32 to levy a sales tax to raise revenue for transportation
within the Commission's district. The statute requires that any tax be
approved by a majority of the local voters.33 In 1980 the Commission
received 54% voter approval for a 1/2% sales tax.34 Two years earlier,
however, Los Angeles County voters had approved Proposition 13 by a
67% majority.35 George Richmond, the Commission's executive direc-
tor, refused to implement the approved tax on the advice of the Attor-
ney General3 6 that section 4 of Proposition 13 required a two-thirds
majority for approval of the tax.37
At issue in Richmond were the definitions of two ambiguous terms
found in section 4: "special districts" and "special taxes."38 Yet the
definition of "special districts" which emerged is a minor point, for the
Richmond court proceeded to define, as well, the intent of the voters
who approved section 4. Each of the three separate opinions in Rich-
mond argued, consistent with Amador, that in passing section 4, the
voters intended that "special taxes" used to replace property tax reve-
nues lost because of Proposition 13 be approved by a two-thirds vote.39
A majority of the court (five justices)4" concluded that the two-
thirds vote requirement of section 4 did not apply to LACTC's sales tax
because the Los Angeles County Transportation District was not a
"special district" within the meaning of section 4. The LACTC was not
empowered to levy property taxes and therefore had no lost property
A retail transactions and use tax ordinance applicable in the incorporated and
unincorporated territory of the County of Los Angeles may be adopted by the Los
Angeles County Transportation Commission in accordance with Part 1.6 (com-
mencing with Section 7251) of Division 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, pro-
vided that a majority of the electors voting on the measure vote to authorize its
enactment at a special election called for that purpose by the commission.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 130350 (West 1973 & Supp. 1983).
32. The LACTC is a special district created by the legislature. Id § 130050. Its govern-
ment is separate and distinct from that of Los Angeles County. Id § 130051. The County
Transportation Commissions Act, passed in 1976, was designed to establish districts which
were concerned only with transportation. Id § 130001.
33. Id § 130350.
34. 31 Cal. 3d at 200, 643 P.2d at 942, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
35. CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE 39 (June 1978).
36. 64 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 156 (1981).
37. 31 Cal. 3d at 200, 643 P.2d at 942, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
38. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 4; see supra note 16.
39. 31 Cal. 3d at 206, 643 P.2d at 946, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 329; id at 209, 643 P.2d at 948,
182 Cal. Rptr. at 331 (Kaus, J., concurring); id at 214-15, 643 P.2d at 951-52, 182 Cal. Rptr.
at 334-35 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (using the word "substitute" rather than
"replacement").
40. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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tax revenues to replace.41 The majority, therefore, held that the
LACTC could enact a sales tax with simple majority approval.42
"Replacement of lost property tax revenues" does not, however,
emerge as the rule of Richmond to be applied in subsequent section 4
interpretation cases. Rather, the plurality established a rule of strict
construction to be used when interpreting section 4 which overshadows
the court's resolution of the specific issue which was before it.43
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
A. Proposition 13. The Initiative Campaign
The drive for Proposition 13 was the result of well intentioned re-
form as well as inflation. The Assessment Reform Act of 1966 required
county assessors to assess all property at a uniform 25% of market value
and to reassess all property as market values changed.4' Prior to the
Act, assessors had set the fractional value of the property that would be
assessed. While there had been some underassessments of business
properties in return for campaign contributions to local assessors,45
family dwellings had been assessed at a lower fraction of value relative
to business properties in the early 1960's.46 The immediate effect of the
Assessment Reform Act, consequently, was to increase the tax bills on
single family homes.47
41. 31 Cal. 3d at 201, 643 P.2d at 943, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 326; id at 208-09, 643 P.2d at
948, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 331 (Kaus, J., concurring).
42. Id at 201-02, 643 P.2d at 943, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
43. Id at 205, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
44. CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 401 (West 1980). The Assessment Reform Act of 1966
added to or amended 105 sections of 5 different codes. EHRMAN & FLAVIN, supra note 6, at
21. The effect of the Assessment Reform Act in an inflationary period was illustrated in a
Wall Street Journal article. "Say a group of 50 homes sold originally for $50,000 and one
now sells for $150,000. All other homes are bumped to an equivalent value [for property tax
purposes]. . . ." Wanniski, The California Tax Revolt, Wall St. J., May 24, 1978, at 22, col.
4.
45. Keppel, Property Taxes and the Revolt, L.A. Times, May 9, 1978, § II, at 1, col. 2.
46. Levy, On Understanding Proposition 13, 56 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 66 (Summer 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Levy]. For example, in San Francisco, single-family housing was as-
sessed at about 9% of market value, whereas commercial buildings were assessed at about
35%. In Alameda County, single-family housing was assessed at 22%, commercial property
at 28%. Id at 68-69. See also CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON REV. & TAX., PROBLEMS OF
PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION IN CALIFORNIA 20-38 (Dec. 1966); Keppel, Property Taxes
and the Revolt, L.A. Times, May 9, 1978, § II, at 1, col. 2 ("Assessors had always calculated
values 'toward' what a given property would presumably bring on the open market. Their
assessments consequently were always some fraction of market value. And the unique role
of residential property, as opposed to commercial holdings, was reflected by an appreciably
lower ratio of assessed value to market value applied to homes.").
47. See supra note 45.
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Residential property tax bills rose sharply during the 1970's. From
1975 to 1978, the assessed valuation of owner-occupied residential
property rose 110%;48 the property taxes paid by homeowners during
this period increased 91%, rising from 32% to 44.3% of total property
taxes paid.49 Proposition 13 found a ready constituency in the 55% of
California voters who occupied their own homes."
Notably, throughout this period, legislators could claim that they
had not raised property taxes. The tax rate remained the same.5 In-
flation, however, was increasing the market value-the tax base-of
homes. The state, which did not levy a residential property tax, was
beginning to accumulate a budget surplus which reached $8.7 billion in
invested funds during 1978.52
Previous initiatives directed toward both property tax and general
tax relief had not been successful. The voters had defeated by a two to
one margin a 1968 initiative which proposed that property taxes be
used only for property related services; that the state government, as
opposed to local governments, assume responsibility for social services
such as education, health and welfare; and that property taxes be lim-
ited to 1% of current market value. 3 An initiative proposed in 1973 by
then Governor Reagan to limit government spending had failed by a
similar margin. 4 Both Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann, initiators of
Proposition 13, introduced tax initiatives in 1970 and 1976 which failed
to obtain sufficient voter signatures to qualify for the ballot.55
Unlike the earlier campaigns, however, Proposition 13's was well-
timed. It occurred during a period of shifting property tax burdens,
rapid inflation that caused both upward reassessments of property val-
48. Kuttner & Kelston, The Shifting Property Tax Burden, 2 PUBLIC POLICY REPORT 11
(Conference on Alternative State and Local Policies 1979) (citing CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANA-
LYST, AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION 13: THE JARVIS-GANN INITIATIVE (May 1978)).
49. Oakland, supra note 11, at 38. This is not to say that other taxes were not increasing
during the same period-the assessed value of business property increased 26.4%. Id
50. Quirt, supra note 3, at 75.
51. Wanniski, The California Tax Revolt, Wall St. J., May 24, 1978, at 22, col. 4.
52. Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Liquidating Calfor-
nia's Surplus, FRB SF WEEKLY LETTER 1 (June 30, 1978). Estimates of the surplus, how-
ever, varied. See Oakland, supra note 11, at 40 ($7.1 billion budget surplus estimated for
1978-1979); Levy, supra note 46, at 80 ($6.1 billion surplus not including federal revenue
sharing funds); CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION 13 191-92 (May
1978) ($3 billion general budget surplus).
53. Proposition 9, CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE 30 (Nov. 1968).
Proposition 14, a similarly worded initiative in 1972, also failed to win voter approval. CAL.
SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE 29 (Nov. 1972).
54. Proposition 1, CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE 5 (Nov. 1973).
55. Levy, supra note 46, at 74.
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ues and bracket creep 56 on income tax returns, and a state budgetary
surplus.57 Volunteer petition circulators were able to gather 1,264,000
signatures within a three month period,58 more than twice the number
required to qualify the initiative for the ballot.59
Perceptions of the initiative differed considerably, Proposition 13
being viewed variously as a way to control property taxes, as a way "to
send a message" to Sacramento that voters were tired of high taxes,6"
and as a way to limit government spending.61 Supporters claimed that
property taxes could be reduced without impairing vital governmental
services, that only bureaucratic waste would be cut,62 and that rents
would decrease as landlords passed on property tax savings to ten-
ants.63 Some economists predicted that Proposition 13 would be a
boon to government treasuries.' In theory, the lower property tax
56. "Bracket creep" describes the phenomenon whereby a taxpayer, whose real income
has not increased, is pushed into a higher tax bracket due to inflation. As his or her real
income remains static, the taxpayer pays a higher proportion of that income in taxes.
57. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
58. EHRMAN & FLAVIN, supra note 6, at 29.
59. The fact that Proposition 13 qualified for the ballot with volunteer petition circula-
tors is significant. In California where petition circulators are generally hired workers paid
an amount determined by the number of signatures gathered, "it was standard practice for
California special-interest groups to hire a firm to collect the signatures for a ballot meas-
ure. . . .The collectors were reportedly paid from 25 to 50 cents per signature." Fitzgerald,;
Computer Democracy, 11 CALIF. J. 1, 6 (June 1980 Special Supp.).
60. Getting the Message, L.A. Times, Apr. 30, 1978, § V, at 4, col. 1 ("Vote Yes on Prop-
osition 13 and send Sacramento a message that you are sick and tired of high taxes."); L.A.
Times, May 28, 1978, § II, at 1, col. 1 ("The pervasive theme, Jarvis believes, is that home-
owners are mad as hell over property taxes and are finally ready to strike back at Sacra-
mento."). This view was widely held despite the fact that property tax revenue is collected
and spent primarily by local entities. See Gould, The California Tax System, CAL. REV. &
TAX. CODE 95 (West 1970). By 1978, state property tax collection was limited to taxes on
railroad cars. See CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 11201-753.
61. L.A. Times, Apr. 11, 1978, § II, at 6, col. 3L (Letters to the Editor) ("Its attractive-
ness to most California taxpayers lies not in [Proposition 13's] rigid formulas to reduce prop-
erty taxes, but its more general potential for slamming the brakes on runaway spending.").
62. CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, VOTER'S PAMPHLET 58, 59 (June 1978) (arguments in
favor of Proposition 13).
63. Id
64. Jude Wanniski, supra note 51, commented:
Prof. Neil Jacoby of the UCLA Business School makes [the argument that Proposi-
tion 13 will mean more, not less revenue to state and local governments] as does
Prof. Arthur Laffer of the USC Business School. Both see [Proposition 13] ex-
panding the tax base.
Mr. Jacoby argues that there will be a building and renovation boom once
people can be sure they won't be penalized for adding a new porch to their house
or committing funds for a new factory. Not only would this boost the property tax
base-helping to offset any direct revenue loss from lower property tax rates-but
it would stimulate personal and business income, thus expanding the income tax
base.
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would increase the state's ability to attract business investment. In-
creased business investment would in turn increase the tax base, lead-
ing to higher tax revenues. Proposition 13's critics, however, contended
that if the initiative became law, there would be, at the very least, con-
siderable disruption in the flow of public services.65 Opponents also
noted that the tax reduction benefits would be enjoyed more by busi-
nesses than by homeowners.66
With the exception of its authors, supporters and opponents of the
initiative alike agreed that it was poorly drafted. Certainly, the meas-
ure was both loosely written and ambiguous. 67 It was inevitable that
the courts would play a major role in the interpretation of Proposition
13.68
B. Amador: The Initial Interpretation
An understanding of the Richmond decision requires an initial
consideration of the California Supreme Court's opinion in Amador
Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equaliza-
tion.69 The Amador court found it necessary to determine the purpose
of Proposition 13 to resolve a challenge based on the constitutional
65. California: Taxpayer's Revolt, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 6, 1978, at 30. Leo McCarthy,
State Assembly Speaker, predicted that the initiative "would strip police services, fire serv-
ices, recreation services, . . . destroy the school systems in the state." Id
66. CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, VOTER'S PAMPHLET 59-60 (June 1978) (Opponents'
statement) ("Homeowners and renters are most in need of property tax relief. But Proposi-
tion 13 gives two-thirds of the property tax decrease to commercial and industrial property
owners.").
67. The legislative analyst stated in the Voter's Pamphlet: "In several instances the ex-
act meaning of language used in this measure is not clear." CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE,
VOTER'S PAMPHLET 56 (June 1978). Milton Freidman, Nobel Prize winner in Economics
and a supporter of Proposition 13, commented: "Jarvis-Gann has many defects. It is loosely
drawn." Freidman, A Progress Report, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 10, 1978, at 70. Donald Hagman,
the UCLA Law Professor who suggested that Proposition 13 had the consistency of yogurt,
was quoted as facetiously advocating that "the authors of [Proposition 13] might be arrested
for drunken drafting." L.A. Times, Aug. 11, 1982, § II, at 9, col. 4. The California Journal
suggested that "[h]ad [Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann] ever dreamed they would become the
drum majors for a parade starting in Los Angeles and Sacramento and playing to record
crowds all the way to the Atlantic coast," they undoubtedly would have taken more care
with the language of Proposition 13. 9 CALIF. J. 216 (July 1978).
68. Perhaps because it was poorly drafted, Proposition 13 became many things to many
people. See supra notes 60-61. The diverse interpretations help to explain the hostility with
which some people regard the court's Proposition 13 decisions. See California Tax Reduc-
tion Movement, Save Proposition 13from Supreme Court Threat (computer mailing solicita-
tion for funds) ("In seven consecutive cases, the Court has ruled against us taxpayers, and
against the clear meaning of Proposition 13." (emphasis added)).
69. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
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"one subject" requirement.7 ° TheAmador court viewed the four major
elements of Proposition 13-real property tax limitation, real property
assessment limitation, state tax restriction, and local tax restriction as
"reasonably interrelated and interdependent. . . reasonably germane,
and functionally related, to the general subject of property tax relief."71
The court did not, however, clearly isolate the purpose of Proposi-
tion 13; in fact, it stated the purpose in two subtly different ways. Ini-
tially, the court declared that "[Proposition 13] is limited to the single
subject of taxation (with particular emphasis on real property tax)."72
Then, after stating that the subject of Proposition 13 was "property tax
relief, '73 the court continued three paragraphs later to discuss the sin-
gle subject requirement, explaining that "[e]ach of the four basic ele-
ments of [Proposition 13] was designed to interlock with the others to
assure an effective tax relief program."74 Whether the purpose of Prop-
osition 13 is viewed as property tax relief or simply as tax relief, of
course, significantly alters the scope and effect of the initiative. The
Richmond majority and dissent focused on the ambiguity created by
the Amador opinion.
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
A convenient way to examine the Richmond opinion is to make
two distinct inquiries-the first into the court's interpretation of the
voters' intent in passing Proposition 13 and the second into the rule of
construction the court applied to the voters' intent to reach an interpre-
tation of section 4.
The decision in Richmond was a plurality decision. However, five
justices, three justices forming the plurality,75 plus the two who signed
the concurring opinion,76 agreed that a "special district," for section 4
purposes, is a district with the authority to levy a property tax.77 The
70. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d) provides: "An initiative measure embracing more than
one subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect."
71. 22 Cal. 3d at 231, 583 P.2d at 1290-91, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 248-49 (citing Perry v.
Jordan, 34 Cal. 2d 87, 207 P.2d 47 (1949)).
72. Id at 224, 583 P.2d at 1286, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
73. Id at 231, 583 P.2d at 1290, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
74. Id at 232, 583 P.2d at 1291, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
75. Justice Mosk wrote the plurality opinion in which Chief Justice Bird and Justice
Broussard joined.
76. Justice Kaus concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Newman.
77. See 31 Cal. 3d at 201, 643 P.2d at 943, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 326 ("[A] governmental
body like LACTC, which does not have the power to levy a property tax, is not the type of
'special district' governed by the section."); id at 209, 643 P.2d at 948, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 331
(Kaus, J., concurring) ("[I]t appears sensible under ordinary principles of constitutional in-
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plurality proceeded to state that this definition resulted from the appli-
cation of a rule of strict construction to the voters' intent of real prop-
erty tax relief.78 The two concurring justices, 79 however, while agreeing
with the plurality's interpretation of special district and the voters' in-
tent, did not find it necessary to discuss the issue of the proper rule of
construction. Justice Richardson, the lone dissenter, concluded that
whatever a "special district" may be, LACTC is certainly within that
definition.80
A. The Plurality Opinion
1. Interpretation of section 4
The plurality identified the goal of Proposition 13 as "real prop-
erty tax relief."'" Its inquiry into the language of section 4 was limited
to the interpretation of "special districts."82
The plurality acknowledged that the language of the initiative it-
self was ambiguous, noting that "special districts" had been given both
general 83 and limited84 definitions at the time Proposition 13 was writ-
ten-definitions which would both include and exclude the LACTC.
Furthermore, the plurality observed, legislation enacted after the pas-
sage of Proposition 13, and with the measure in contemplation, offered
no plain guidance to the meaning of "special districts." 85 Conse-
quently, support for both a broad and limited definition can be found
in contemporaneous legislation. Justice Mosk referred to section 50077
terpretation to construe section 4's reference to 'special districts' to apply only to those spe-
cial districts which had the authority to impose property taxes .... ").
78. 31 Cal. 3d at 205, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328 ("[Tlhe language of section 4
must be strictly construed . . ").
79. Justice Kaus and Justice Newman.
80. 31 Cal. 3d at 209-10, 643 P.2d at 948, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 331 (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing) ("[T]he ordinance is invalid both because the tax it purports to enact is a 'special tax'
and because it has been adopted by a 'special district' without the approval of two-thirds of
the qualified voters thereof, in violation of article XIII A, section 4.").
81. 31 Cal. 3d at 201, 643 P.2d at 943, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
82. Id at 201-02, 643 P.2d at 943, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 326. The plurality did not reach a
definition of "special taxes." According to the reasoning of the plurality, if the LACTC were
not a "special district," neither it nor any taxes it might levy would come within the ambit of
section 4. Id
83. Id at 202, 643 P.2d at 943, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 326 (A "special district" is "'a legally
constituted governmental entity established for the purpose of carrying on specific activities
within defined boundaries."' (quoting SEN. FACT FINDING COMM. ON REV. & TAX., INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS IN CAL. 177 (June 1965))).
84. 31 Cal. 3d at 202, 643 P.2d at 943-44, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 329 ("[S]ome statutes exclude
from the definition of 'special district' 'any agency which is not authorized by statute to levy
a property tax rate."' (quoting CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 2215 (West 1980))).
85. 31 Cal. 3d at 206, 643 P.2d at 946, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
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of the Government Code, which defines a district for purposes of Prop-
osition 13 as "an agency of the state, formed pursuant to general law or
special act, for the local performance of governmental or proprietary
functions within limited boundaries" 6 and concluded that this defini-
tion could include the LACTC.87 However, he also cited section 16271
of the Government Code which contains a definition of "special dis-
trict" which would exclude the LACTC by excluding "any agency
which is not authorized to levy a property tax, except the Bay Area
Pollution District."88
The material in the Voter's Pamphlet, however, persuaded the plu-
rality that "special districts" should be read narrowly. 9 Justice Mosk
cited the legislative analyst's statement that "'[Proposition 13] would
restrict the ability of local governments to impose new taxes in order to
replace the property tax revenue losses.' "90 From this, the plurality
concluded that "[s]ince only those 'special districts' which levied prop-
erty taxes could 'replace' the 'loss' of such taxes, [the legislative ana-
lyst's statement] impl[ied] that the 'special districts' referred to are those
which are authorized to levy a property tax."91
2. Rule of construction
The plurality conceded that a narrow reading of "special district"
was not compelled.92 Then, however, breaking established precedent,93
the plurality proceeded to argue that the language of section 4 should
be strictly construed.94 The court justified this position with a discus-
86. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50075 (West 1980).
87. 31 Cal. 3d at 206-07, 643 P.2d at 946-47, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 329-30. Justice Mosk
noted that while section 50077 uses the term "district" as opposed to "special district," sec-
tion 50077 was enacted to implement Proposition 13 which uses the term "special district."
88. Id at 206, 643 P.2d at 946, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 16271(d) (West 1980); accord CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 2215 (West 1980).
89. 31 Cal. 3d at 205, 643 P.2d at 646, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328-29.
90. Id at 206, 643 P.2d at 946, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (quoting CAL. SECRETARY OF
STATE, VOTER'S PAMPHLET 60 (June 1978)).
91. 31 Cal. 3d at 206, 643 P.2d at 946, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
92. Id at 205, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
93. The plurality reiterated the guidelines set forth in .4mador, 22 Cal. 3d at 245, 583
P.2d at 1299-1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 257-58 (A constitutional provision "should be construed
in accordance with the natural and ordinary meaning of its words. . . .The literal lan-
guage. . . may be disregarded to avoid absurd results and to fulfill the apparent intent of
the framers. . . and the language used must 'receive a liberal, practical common-sense con-
struction.'" (emphasis added by the plurality) (citations omitted)). 31 Cal. 3d at 202-03, 643
P.2d at 944, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 327. The plurality acknowledged that it was departing from
the established rule. Id at 205, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
94. 31 Cal. 3d at 205, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328 ("In view of the fundamen-
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sion of the two-thirds vote requirement and, secondarily, with a discus-
sion of local control.
The plurality began its justification of strict construction with the
forceful statement that a super-majority vote requirement is inherently
undemocratic.95 While acknowledging that the constitutionality of the
requirement itself was not at issue,96 the plurality, nonetheless, found it
appropriate to examine both the effect and the subject of the extraordi-
nary majority requirement.
9 7
The court noted that the effect of a two-thirds approval require-
ment is to give voters opposing a measure two votes while those favor-
ing it have but one.9" In addition, the requirement generally acts to
deter the proposed action since such a high degree of agreement is unu-
sual.9 9 The plurality also noted that the usual justifications for impos-
ing a two-thirds vote requirement were missing in Richmond.'°0
The plurality also examined the subject of the two-thirds vote re-
quirement.' 0 ' The greater the extent to which a vote pertains to a
purely local concern, the plurality reasoned, the less appropriate a two-
thirds vote requirement imposed by statewide voters. Because the taxes
in Richmond were local sales taxes for local transportation purposes,
the burden of which would be borne largely by the local population,
the vote required to approve the tax should not be a statewide voter's
concern. The plurality emphasized that the matter was a purely local
concern.1
0 2
In light of the fundamentally undemocratic nature of the two-
tally undemocratic nature of the requirement for an extraordinary majority and the matters
discussed above, the language of section 4 must be strictly construed .
95. Id
96. Id at 203, 643 P.2d at 944, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 327. In Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d
765, 471 P.2d 487, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1970), vacatedsub nom. Mihaly v. Westbrook, 403 U.S.
915 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971), the California Supreme Court held a two-thirds
vote requirement for local bonds unconstitutional on federal equal protection grounds. The
United States Supreme Court, in Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971), held, however, that
such a requirement was unconstitutional only if it discriminated against an identifiable class.
Id at 7.
97. 31 Cal. 3d at 203-04, 643 P.2d at 944, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
98. 31 Cal. 3d at 204, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328 (citing Gordon v. Lance, 403
U.S. at 6; Westbrook v. Mihlay, 2 Cal. 3d at 783, 471 P.2d at 499, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 851).
99. 31 Cal. 3d at 204, 643 P.2d at 944, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328 (quoting Westbrook v.
Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d at 792, 471 P.2d at 506, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 858).
100. Two of the justifications cited by the Supreme Court in Gordon were the protection
of property and the credit of the unborn. 403 U.S. at 6. The plurality in Richmond argued
that a local sales tax did not interfere with any fundamental individual rights. 31 Cal. 3d at
204, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
101. Id
102. Id
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thirds vote requirement and the purely local impact and character of
the LACTC's tax, the plurality concluded that "the language of section
4 must be strictly construed and ambiguities resolved in favor of per-
mitting voters of cities, counties and 'special districts' to enact 'special
taxes' by a majority rather than a two-thirds vote."' °
B. The Dissenting Opinion
1. Interpretation of section 4
In his dissent, Justice Richardson identified the goal of Proposition
13 as both effective realproperty tax relief""° and tax relief.15 His in-
quiry extended to the term "special taxes" as well as "special
districts."'
' 0 6
The language of the initiative itself suggested to Justice Richard-
son that the LACTC is a "special district."1 7 He considered the taxing
limitations imposed by Proposition 13 comprehensive.0 8 Urging a
parallel construction between sections 3 and 4, he noted that because
section 3 requires a two-thirds vote by the state legislature to impose
any new taxes, section 4 should be interpreted to require a two-thirds
vote for any local tax, regardless of the identity of the entity imposing
the tax. 0 9 Consequently, the LACTC would be within the ambit of
section 4. Again focusing on the language of the initiative, he con-
cluded that the word "special" in "special taxes" should be interpreted
broadly to mean "extra" or "additional" rather than narrowly to mean
"unusual" or "extraordinary.""'
Justice Richardson also found support in contemporaneous legis-
103. Id at 205, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
104. 31 Cal. 3d at 211, 643 P.2d at 949, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 332 (Richardson, J., dissenting)
("We concluded that these four elements formed 'an interlocking "package" deemed neces-
sary by the initiative's framers to assure effective real property tax relief.' " (emphasis in
original)).
105. Id at 215, 643 P.2d at 952, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 335 ("[It is apparent that the broadest
possible definition of 'special taxes' would best serve that objective of tax relief.").
106. See supra note 82.
107. 31 Cal. 3d at 214, 643 P.2d at 951, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
108. "The two-thirds voter approval requirement has been constitutionally ordained not
only for tax increases instituted by counties, cities and special districts (§ 4), but also tax
increases implemented by the state Legislature itself (§ 3)." Id
109. "To recognize an otherwise undefined residual category of local government agen-
cies, 'nonspecial districts' as it were, which are free to impose new or increased taxes without
the two-thirds vote approval requirement is anomolous at best." Id
110. "In my view, the most natural 'ordinary' meaning of the term 'special taxes' within
the context of article XIII A includes the kind of substitutional or replacement tax adopted
by LACTC which serves to offset the reduction of real property taxes enforced by sections I
and 2 of the amendment." Id at 218, 643 P.2d at 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
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lation for his assertion that the LACTC was a "special district." Noting
that the broad definition of the term "district" contained in Govern-
ment Code section 50077 would include the LACTC,"' he reasoned
that section 50077 should control because it was passed in "[a]n obvi-
ous attempt to comply with the constitutional directive of [Proposition
13]."1,12
As had the plurality, the dissent cited the legislative analyst's state-
ment in the Voter's Pamphlet that "'[tihe initiative would restrict the
ability of local governments to impose new taxes in order to replace the
property tax revenue losses.' "113 Unlike the plurality, however, Justice
Richardson concluded that the LACTC was a "special district" because
it was replacing lost property tax revenues. He refuted the plurality's
rationale that LACTC was not a "special district" because it had no
authority to levy property taxes. "We nowhere suggested in Amador
• . . that it was only those state or local agencies . . . empowered to
levy real property taxes which were barred by the amendment from
frustrating the objective of property tax relief."' 14 He then reasoned
that the LACTC was well within the ambit of section 4 because it per-
formed a service (improvement of public transportation) "which could
well be funded by receipts from a real property tax imposed by the
county.""' 5 The sales tax levied by the LACTC, a special district,
would replace lost property tax revenues that, but for Proposition 13,
could have been levied and used by other local governments, either Los
Angeles City or Los Angeles County, for public transportation.
The dissent also used the Voter's Pamphlet to conclude that the
sales tax levied by the LACTC was a "special tax" within section 4.
From statements of the legislative analyst"16 and the proponents of the
initiative," 7 the dissent interpreted "special taxes" to mean "all" taxes.
111. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50077(d) (West 1980) (district defined broadly as an agency of
the state, formed pursuant to general law or special act for the local performance of govern-
ment or proprietary functions within limited boundaries).
112. 31 Cal. 3d at 213-14, 643 P.2d at 951, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
113. Id at 215, 643 P.2d at 952, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 335 (quoting CAL. SECRETARY OF
STATE, VOTER'S PAMPHLET 60 (June 1978)).
114. 31 Cal. 3d at 212, 643 P.2d at 950, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 333 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
115. Id
116. Id at 216, 643 P.2d at 952, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 335 (" '[N]ew taxes would have to be
approved by two-thirds of local voters."' (quoting CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, VOTER'S
PAMPHLET 60 (June 1978))).
117. 31 Cal. 3d at 216, 643 P.2d at 952, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 335 (" '[Proposition 13] requires
all other tax raises to be approved by the people."' (quoting CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE,
VOTER'S PAMPHLET 58 (June 1978) (Proponent's Arguments) (emphasis added by the
dissent)).
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2. Rule of construction
Justice Richardson stated the general rule that constitutional
amendments are to be construed liberally' 18 and noted further that the
"specialness" of the initiative process required such a rule. "'[T]he
power of the initiative must be liberally construed. . . to promote the
democratic process.' "119 He contended that the plurality's justifica-
tions could not support a rule of liberal construction, reminding the
plurality that the two-thirds vote requirement is constitutional. 120 Fur-
thermore, he contended that the two-thirds vote requirement for local
taxes was "defensible largely as the preserver of 'home rule'
principles."' 121
C. The Concurring Opinion
- 1. Interpretation of section 4
Noting that the language of section 4 was far from clear, the con-
curring justices 122 relied on the Voter's Pamphlet to find that the pur-
pose of section 4 was "to limit the authority of a city, county or special
district to impose new 'special taxes' to replaceproperty tax revenue that
the city, county or special district lost as a result of the other portions of
Proposition 13. " 123 Justice Kaus, agreeing with the plurality, con-
cluded that it would be "sensible" to construe "special districts" to
mean only those districts which had the authority to impose property
taxes, because only those districts could have lost property tax revenue
which needed to be replaced. He further noted that this definition was
not unique to the context of Proposition 13.124 As had Justice Richard-
son in his dissent, Justice Kaus cited contemporaneous legislation as a
118. 31 Cal. 3d at 211, 643 P.2d at 949, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 332 (Primary goal "in interpret-
ing constitutional language is to give full effect to the framer's objective . . . ." (quoting
Mills v. County of Trinity, 108 Cal. App. 3d 656, 660, 166 Cal. Rptr. 674, 676 (1980)). See
also supra note 93.
119. 31 Cal. 2d at 211, 643 P.2d at 949, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 332 (Initiative power reserved to
the people in CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 "'so that they may alter or reform government when
the public good may require."' (quoting San Diego Bldg. Contractors v. City Council, 13
Cal. 3d 205, 210 n.3, 529 P.2d 570, 572-73 n.3, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148-49 n.3 (1974))).
120. 31 Cal. 3d at 210, 643 P.2d at 948-49, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 331-32 (citing Gordon v.
Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 7 (1971); Amador v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d at 237, 583 P.2d
at 1294-95, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 252-53).
121. 31 Cal. 3d at 217, 643 P.2d at 953, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 336 (citing Amador v. State Bd.
of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d at 226-28, 583 P.2d at 1287-88, 149 Cal. Rptr. 245-47).
122. Justice Kaus and Justice Newman.
123. 31 Cal. 3d at 208-09, 643 P.2d at 948, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 331 (emphasis in original)
(Kaus, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 209, 643 P.2d at 948, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
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source of the definitions of "special districts." Unlike the dissent, how-
ever, he chose statutes with a narrow definition of "special districts"
which would exclude the LACTC. 25
2. Rule of construction
The concurring opinion did not reach the question of the appro-
priate rule of construction, suggesting only that "ordinary principles of
constitutional interpretation" be used to construe section 4.126 The
opinion did not make clear, however, what those "ordinary principles"
are.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Interpretation of Section 4
In Amador, the California Supreme Court established a two-step
method for judicial construction of Proposition 13.127 First, the court
must determine the intent of the voters in passing the initiative.'28
Then, the court must construe the language of the initiative so as to
125. Id at 209 n. 1, 643 P.2d at 948 n. 1, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 331 n. 1 (citing CAL. REV. & TAX.
CODE § 2215 (West 1980); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16271(d) (West 1980)).
126. Id ("[Ilt appears sensible under ordinary principles of constitutional interpretation
to construe section 4's reference to 'special districts' to apply only to those special districts
which had the authority to impose property taxes. .... ").
127. 22 Cal. 3d at 244-46, 583 P.2d at 1299-1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 257-58. While the
language of Amador may give the impression that initiative interpretation is a simple process
of applying a set of rules of construction to unclear terms, an analysis of the cited cases
suggests that the interpretation is at least a two-step process. A two-step process was used in
Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr.
761 (1972), where the court construed a provision of the California Environmental Quality
Act of 1970.
In resolving the conflict on intent, as we must, we conclude that the Legisla-
ture intended the EQA to be interpreted in such manner as to afford the fullest
possible protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory
language. We also conclude that to achieve that maximum protection the Legisla-
ture necessarily intended to include within the operation of the act, private activi-
ties for which a government permit. . . for use is necessary.
Id at 259, 502 P.2d at 1056, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
128. 22 Cal. 3d at 245-46, 583 P.2d at 1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 258. See also In re Quinn,
35 Cal. App. 3d 473, 483, 110 Cal. Rptr. 881, 887 (1973) ("The courts must interpret a consti-
tutional amendment to give effect to the intent of the voters adopting it." (citing Kaiser v.
Hopkins, 6 Cal. 2d 537, 538 (1936))).
The question of voter intent is a recurrent theme in any Proposition 13 analysis case.
See L.A. Daily J., May 16, 1983, § I, at 1, col. 1 ("As with many other Proposition 13 cases
that have plagued California courts since 1978, a key dispute in the case of Armstrong P.
County of San Mateo [146 Cal. App. 3d 597, 194 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1983)] is what the Califor-
nia electorate meant in voting for the initiative.").
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carry out the voters' intent. 129
The Amador court listed several constructional aids properly em-
ployed by a court for resolving ambiguities in the language of the initi-
ative. 130  A constitutional amendment should be construed in
accordance with the natural and ordinary meaning of its words;13 ' am-
biguities may be resolved by reference to contemporaneous construc-
tion by the legislature or administrative agencies charged with
implementing the new enactment; 132 and the ballot summary and argu-
ments and analysis presented to the electorate may be helpful in deter-
mining the probable meaning of uncertain language.'
33
1. What was the intent of the voters? 
34
The Amador court repeatedly stated that the underlying purpose
of the four sections of Proposition 13 taken together was "effective real
property tax relief."' 135 Subsequent Proposition 13 cases have cited this
objective as the purpose of the amendment. 136
-
Sections 1 and 2 granted direct property tax relief. By themselves,
however, sections 1 and 2 would provide shallow relief if other taxes
could be raised immediately to compensate for revenue shortfalls
129. 22 Cal. 3d at 244-45, 583 P.2d at 1299-1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 257. See also Stephens
v. Chambers, 34 Cal. App. 660, 663-64, 168 P. 595, 596 (1917) ("[A written constitution] is
not to be interpreted according to narrow or super-technical principles, but liberally and on
broad general lines, so that it may accomplish in full measure the objects of its establishment
130. 22 Cal. 3d at 245-46, 583 P.2d at 1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 257-58.
131. Id at 245, 583 P.2d at 1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 257-58. See also In re Quinn, 35 Cal.
App. 3d 473, 482, 110 Cal. Rptr. 881, 887 (1973).
132. 22 Cal. 3d at 245, 583 P.2d at 1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 258. See also South Dakota v.
Brown, 20 Cal. 3d 765,777, 576 P.2d 473,481, 144 Cal. Rptr. 758, 766 (1978) ("We have held
that . . . 'the contemporaneous administrative construction of the enactment by those
charged with its enforcement and interpretation is entitled to great weight, and courts gener-
ally will not depart from such construction unless it is clearly erroneous or unauthorized.'"
(quoting City of Los Angeles v. Rancho Homes, Inc., 40 Cal. 2d 764, 770-71, 256 P.2d 305,
308 (1953))).
133. 22 Cal. 3d at 245-46, 583 P.2d at 1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 258. See also Carter v.
Seaboard Fin. Co., 33 Cal. 2d 564, 580-81,203 P.2d 758, 772 (1949) ("Recourse may be had,
as an aid to interpretation, first to the summary prepared by the attorney general. . . and
then to the arguments for and against the measure [presented] to the voters and set forth in
the pamphlets accompanying the sample ballots and appearing immediately following the
attorney general's summary.").
134. See infra notes 135-36, 138-40 and accompanying text.
135. 22 Cal. 3d at 230, 231, 243, 583 P.2d at 1290, 1291, 1296, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 248, 249,
256.
136. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan, 27 Cal. 3d 855, 616 P.2d 802, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 820 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 918 (1981); County of Fresno v. Malmstrom, 94 Cal.
App. 3d 974, 156 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1979).
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caused by the decrease in real property taxes. Viewed in conjunction
with sections 1 and 2, sections 3 and 4 complement the primary goal of
property tax relief; they insure that property tax savings achieved
through sections 1 and 2 are not easily taxed away.' 37 Any interpreta-
tion of section 4, consequently, should be consistent with the voter in-
tent of "effective real property tax relief."
Yet the Amador court also suggested that the goal of Proposition
13 was general tax relief, not just property tax relief.'38 The fact that
the ballot title for Proposition 13 was "A Tax Relief Measure,' 39 not
"A Property Tax Relief Measure," lends support for such an interpreta-
tion. It is conceivable, therefore, that the voters understood the pur-
pose of Proposition 13 to be total tax relief. Following this view, the
provisions of sections 3 and 4 must be regarded as designed to function
independently of sections 1 and 2. The effect of sections 3 and 4 would
be to limit all other taxes. An interpretation of section 4 consistent with
total tax relief would be, therefore, broader than an interpretation lim-
ited by the purpose "effective real property tax relief." Because of the
two differing purposes announced in Amador, both the Richmond plu-
rality and dissent were able to cite Amador as authority for their con-
flicting interpretations of section 4.
The three opinions in Richmond either explicitly (the plurality and
the dissent) or implicitly (the concurrence) followed the steps set out in
Amador to determine the intent of section 4. Each first considered the
language of the section itself, next the contemporaneous construction
by the legislature and finally the statements in the Voter's Pamphlet. In
Richmond, the first two steps lead to inconclusive results. In each of
the three opinions, the interpretation of the phrase "replacement of
property taxes" found in the Voter's Pamphlet was the decisive factor.
a. language of sec/ion 4
The dictionary definition of "special" neither supports nor refutes
137. This interpretation is consistent with the tenor of the Proposition 13 campaign. In
Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan, 27 Cal. 3d 855, 616 P.2d 802, 167 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1980),
the court noted that "Proposition 13 was widely publicized as a taxpayer's revolt providing
tax relief for homeowners." Id at 864, 616 P.2d at 807, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 825. "But the
single most inflammatory factor [presaging the adoption of Proposition 13], the one that
fanned the flames, was the dramatic increase in the burden of the property tax, particularly
on California homeowners." Id at n.9 (quoting EHRMAN & FLAVIN, supra note 6, at 28).
138. 22 Cal. 3d at 232, 583 P.2d at 1291, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 249. ("[E]ach of the four basic
elements of Article XIIIA was designed to interlock with the others to assure an effective tax
relief program.").
139. CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, VOTER'S PAMPHLET 58 (June 1978).
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the contention that the voters intended "special districts" to refer to
something less than all districts, and that "special taxes" should not be
interpreted to mean all taxes. 140 Nor does the term "special districts"
have a fixed meaning. 14 1 Initially, it is possible to argue that the voter
who confronted the phrase "cities, counties and special districts" un-
derstood the words to mean any local government body and that sec-
tion 4 was actually intended to apply to any local taxing agency by
whatever name it may be designated. This view is subject, however, to
the counter argument that the section specifically identified three enti-
ties, and that the voters, therefore, must have intended separate
meanings.
Nor does the structure of the amendment as a whole clarify the
meaning of "special" in "special districts." While section l(a) refers
only to "districts," which tends to suggest that a "special district" must
be regarded as a different type of entity, subsequent legislation clarified
that "districts" in section 1 meant cities, counties and special districts,
the same wording as in section 4. However, this still left "special dis-
trict" undefined.
The term "special taxes" also lacks an independent meaning. 42
Rather, as used in state and local statutes, the phrase acquires meaning
from the context of the statute. 14 3 The structure of Proposition 13 sug-
gests that the term was not intended to refer to all taxes. Section 3
140. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1981) ("Special-i: dis-
tinguished by some unusual quality; . . . 4a: supplemental to the regular, extra; . . . 6:
containing particulars."). The court in Amador cautioned that the words of an initiative
should be given a common sense interpretation rather than a narrow or technical meaning.
See supra note 128.
141. See Hamilton, Districts-What are They, CAL. ST. B.J. 119, 120 (1968). Apart from
the idea of a defined area, "district" usually refers to one of the following concepts:
1. Administrative areas established for the convenience of the govern-
ment ...
2. Tax or special assessment areas established to bear the burden of an ex-
traordinary tax or special assessment levied for local purposes ...
3. Areas under the jurisdiction of a public corporation exercising corporate
powers within such areas for local purposes ...
Id.
142. See CAL. SENATE COMM. REV. & TAX., PROPOSITION 13: STATE AND LOCAL FISCAL
OUTLOOK 208 (Nov. 14, 1978) ("special taxes" has no particular meaning in the context of
Proposition 13).
143. 31 Cal. 3d at 216, 643 P.2d at 952, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 335. Cf. City of Glendale v.
Trondsen, 48 Cal. 2d 43, 308 P.2d 1 (1957). The court interpreted a provision in the Glen-
dale City Charter providing that the total tax rate not exceed 1% of assessed valuation,
unless a special tax were authorized by two-thirds vote. The court warned that the words of
the provision must be construed within the context of the city charter. Id at 99, 308 P.2d at
4. The court concluded that the rubbish collection charge was not a special tax because it
was not a tax on property. Consequently, the charge did not require a two-thirds vote.
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demands a two-thirds vote approval in the legislature for any changes
in state taxes. Thus, the structure of Proposition 13 itself suggests that
had section 4 been meant to cover all taxes, the modifier "all" or at
least "local" would have been chosen rather than "special."
b. contemporaneous legislation
TheAmador court suggested that some of the ambiguities of Prop-
osition 13 could be resolved by the legislature. 44 However, the statutes
passed implementing Proposition 13 contain definitions of "special dis-
tricts" which would both include and exclude the LACTC. The Rich-
mond plurality and dissent each cited legislation favorable to its own
position. 145 The usefulness of such statutes, as aids to interpretation, is
further diminished by the fact that each of them was specifically tai-
lored to individual problems raised by the passage of Proposition 13.
No one piece of legislation was meant to serve as an omnibus interpre-
tation of the amendment's language.
The dissent found Government Code section 50077 to be control-
ling.146 That statute broadly defines the term "special district" as "an
agency of the state formed pursuant to general law or special act, for
the local performance of governmental or proprietary functions within
limited boundaries."' 4 7 While the LACTC appears to fit within the
boundaries of this definition, the purpose of the legislation codified as
section 50077 was to give local entities authority to levy taxes which
they had not previously enjoyed. 141 Proposition 13 had severely ham-
pered the revenue raising capability of entities whose taxing authority
was limited either substantially or entirely to property taxes. By enact-
ing section 50077, the legislature simply intended to provide these enti-
ties with the authority to levy another type of tax. The plurality's point
144. 22 Cal. 3d at 245, 583 P.2d at 1301, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 258. See supra note 132.
Subsequent legislation, however, has not always been helpful. For instance, in the interpre-
tation of "indebtedness," an ambiguous phrase in section 1, subsequent legislation did not
resolve the ambiguity. "'Nobody really knew at the time what it meant,' said David Doerr,
consultant to the Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee . . . . 'We just wrote the
[legislation] using the term "indebtedness" as it was used in Proposition 13.'" Luther, Con.
fusion on Proposition 13 Tax Clouds L.A. Tax Question, L.A. Times, May 10, 1983, § II, at 3,
col. 1.
145. See supra notes 86-88, 111-12 and accompanying text.
146. 31 Cal. 3d at 213-14, 643 P.2d at 951, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 334 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
147. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50077 (West 1980).
148. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50075 (West 1980) ("It is the intent of the Legislature to provide
all cities, counties, and districts with the authority to impose special taxes, pursuant to the
provisions of Article XIII A of the California Constitution.").
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that the LACTC already had the authority to levy a sales tax and con-
sequently did not need section 50077 to levy a tax, although not conclu-
sive, suggests that the LACTC does not necessarily fall within the
statute's broad definition of "special district."'
' 49
The plurality cited Government Code section 16271(d).150 Section
16271 defines "special district" to exclude "any agency which is not
authorized to levy a property tax rate."' 51 This definition would ex-
clude the LACTC, which never had the authority to levy a property
tax. However, to understand the relevancy of section 16271, it is again
necessary to examine the purpose of the legislation. After the passage
of Proposition 13, the legislature allocated "bailout funds" from the
state budget surplus to those entities which lost property tax revenues
due to Proposition 13.152 The immediate concern of the legislature was
to maintain some degree of local revenue equilibrium while the locali-
ties adjusted to the effects of Proposition 13.'1 3 The LACTC had not
lost property tax revenue and the legislature did not intend bailout
funds to benefit those entities which had lost nothing. Thus, this statute
does not support the conclusion that the LACTC was not a "special
district" for purposes of section 4.
c. the voter's pamphlet
The Voter's Pamphlet, sent to all registered voters before an elec-
tion, contains a title and brief summary of each proposition on the bal-
lot prepared by the Attorney General, an interpretation and prediction
of the proposal's effects prepared by the legislative analyst, and argu-
ments by both the proponents and the opponents. Therefore, in theory
at least, the voter sees and evaluates more than just the words of the
initiative when deciding how to vote. The information contained in the
149. 31 Cal. 3d at 207, 643 P.2d at 947, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
150. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16271(d) (West 1980). The dissent did not deal with this
section.
151. Id Section 16271(d) provides in pertinent part: "'Special district' does not include
any agency which is not authorized to levy a property tax rate, except the Bay Area Pollu-
tion Control District."
152. "The amount of 'bailout' to be provided in 1978-79 was based on estimates of the
property tax loss experienced by each agency. . . .The Legislature's purpose [in S.B. 154]
was to ensure that local governments would be reimbursed only for tax revenues lost after
Proposition 13." 1 CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. REV. & TAX., PROPOSITION 13 TAX RATE ISSUES
40-41 (1980) (emphasis in original).
153. "This bill [S.B. 154] has as its purpose the partial relief of local governments from
the temporary difficulties brought about by the approval of Proposition 13 at the June 6,
1978, election." 1978 Cal. Stat. Summary Digest 70.
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Voter's Pamphlet could appropriately be considered what "everybody
knew" about Proposition 13.
All three Richmond opinions used the Voter's Pamphlet in an ef-
fort to discern the intent of the voters in section 4. All three opinions
focused on the word "replace" in the legislative analyst's statement that
"the initiative would restrict the ability of local governments to impose
new taxes in order to replace the property tax revenue losses."' The
opinions took divergent views, however, on what it means to replace
property tax revenue.
The concurrence suggested that, using "ordinary principles" of
constitutional interpretation, the term "special districts," as the term is
used in section 4, refers only to those districts which have the authority
to impose property taxes, because only those districts can have property
tax losses to replace.' 55 The plurality, citing the same sentence, con-
cluded that "[s]ince only those 'special districts' which levied property
taxes could 'replace' the 'loss' of such taxes, these statements imply that
the 'special districts' referred to are those which are authorized to levy a
property tax.'
'156
Five members of the court, the plurality and the two justices who
joined in the concurrence, structured their arguments in a similar man-
ner. They argued that because those who voted for Proposition 13 were
concerned about property taxes, section 4 can be interpreted as
designed to prevent local entities from increasing "other" taxes, of any
type, to replace lost property taxes. 157 A local entity without authority
to levy property taxes has lost nothing because of Proposition 13 and
consequently has nothing to replace. Therefore, for purposes of section
4, a "special district" is a district with the authority to raise property
taxes. Undeniably, this definition reached the majority of special dis-
tricts within California at the time Proposition 13 was passed. But of
greater importance for the Richmond case, it did not reach the LACTC
because the LACTC only had the authority to levy a sales tax, not a
property tax.
In criticizing the plurality's conclusion, the dissent suggested that
the error was due to the plurality's use of a rule of strict construction.158
154. CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, VOTER'S PAMPHLET 60 (JUNE 1978) "Replacement of
property taxes" appears throughout the legislative analyst's opinion.
155. 31 Cal. 3d at 208-09, 643 P.2d at 948, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 331 (Kaus, J., concurring).
156. Id at 206, 643 P.2d at 946, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
157. Id at 206, 643 P.2d at 946, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 329; id at 208-09, 643 P.2d at 948, 182
Cal. Rptr. at 331 (Kaus, J., concurring).
158. Id at 210, 643 P.2d at 949, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 332 (Richardson, J., dissenting) ("In my
view, neither the adoption of a new rule of strict construction within this context, nor its
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The dissent ignored the fact, however, that the concurrence also
reached the conclusion that the LACTC was not a special district, with-
out using a rule of strict construction. 5 9 The rule of construction,
therefore, was not the determinative factor accounting for the differ-
ence between the conclusion reached by the plurality and that reached
by the dissent.
One key to the difference lies in the Amador opinion's failure to
define the purpose of Proposition 13 with sufficient clarify. While the
opinions of the plurality and the concurrence in Richmond rested on
the conclusion that the voters' intent was "effective real property tax
relief," the dissent referred to both purposes cited in Amador: effective
real property tax relief 160 and tax relief.16 1 As a result, it is unclear
whether the dissent's conclusion that the LACTC's sales tax was a
''special tax" derives from a determination that the voters intended to
obtain effective property tax relief or simply tax relief.
Regardless, however, of which of the two possible purposes relied
upon, the dissent broadly concluded that the LACTC is a special dis-
trict. If Justice Richardson viewed the purpose of Proposition 13 as
total tax relief, he failed to discuss the stare decisis effect of the other
purpose announced inAmador: that of effective real property tax relief.
Furthermore, the dissent did not engage in the two-step process offirst
identifying the voters' intent and then liberally construing the initiative
to give effect to the intent. 162 The dissent instead followed a liberal rule
of construction to identify the purpose of the voters as well as to con-
strue the language of the initiative. In short, the dissent identified the
purpose of the voters as broadly as possible-tax relief in general-and
then proceeded to apply a liberal interpretation to give tax relief the
fullest possible meaning. 63 Although the dissent's argument may have
application which obscures LACTC's identity as a 'special district' within the constitutional
meaning, is legally sound.").
159. Id at 209, 643 P.2d at 946, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 331 (Kaus, J., concurring) ("[lit appears
sensible under ordinary principles of constitutional interpretation to construe section 4's ref-
erence to 'special districts' to apply only to those special districts which had the authority to
impose property taxes, for it is only those districts which could sufferproperty tax losses for
which the new special tax revenues would serve as a replacement." (emphasis in original)).
160. Id at 211, 643 P.2d at 949, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 332 (Richardson, J., dissenting) ("We
concluded that these four elements formed 'an interlocking "package" deemed necessary
... to assure effectlive realproperty tax relief .... '" (emphasis in original)).
161. Id at 215, 643 P.2d at 952, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 335 (Richardson, J., dissenting) ("[Ilt is
apparent that the broadest possible definition of 'special taxes' would best serve that objec-
tive of tax relief." (emphasis added)).
162. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
163. 31 Cal. 3d at 215, 643 P.2d at 952, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 335 (Richardson, J., dissenting)
("[I]t is apparent that the broadest possible definition of 'special taxes' would best serve that
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been couched in terms of "effective real property tax relief,"' 164 the dis-
sent actually interpreted section 4 consistent with the broader purpose
of tax relief.
Alternatively, the dissent's different result in Richmond may be
consistent with the Proposition 13 purpose of effective real property tax
relief. Justice Richardson's conclusion that the LACTC tax was in-
tended as a replacement for property taxes was based on the theory that
the term "replacement" refers, not to the source of government funds,
but to their function. 165 Because public transportation is a proper func-
tion of city and county governments, he explained, such services could
be funded by a real property tax.166 Therefore, transportation services
were affected by Proposition 13 in that the reduction in property tax
revenues reduced the city or county budgetary ability to fund transpor-
tation. By this reasoning, the LACTC tax was necessarily a replace-
ment for the lost property taxes.
The connection discerned by Justice Richardson between the
LACTC sales tax and city or county property tax revenues is that both
may be used for transportation purposes. The crucial inquiry of this
"function" theory is whether the purpose in question is a function of
local government which could be funded by property taxes. If so, Jus-
tice Richardson would reason, the tax to be levied to support that func-
tion should be considered a replacement for the property tax.
This analysis produces anomalous results. Although this concept
of replacement has appeal when applied to communities that levy a
property tax, it would in theory apply equally to a local government
which did not levy a property tax but which provided the same serv-
objective of tax relief."); id at 216, 643 P.2d at 953, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 336 ("the broader
purpose of 'effective' tax relief').
164. Id. at 212, 643 P.2d at 950, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 333 (Richardson, J., dissenting) ("[W]e
clearly identified the objective of the framers of Article XIII A as seeking 'to assure effective
real property tax relief.'" (emphasis in original)). But cf. 31 Cal. 3d at 215, 643 P.2d at 952,
182 Cal. Rptr. at 335 (Richardson, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is apparent that the broadest possible
definition of 'special taxes' would best serve that objective of tax relief." (emphasis added)).
165. Id at 219, 643 P.2d at 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 337 (Richardson, J., dissenting) ("Fo-
cusing. . . upon the function of government which it proposes to accomplish from that tax
166. Id at 215, 643 P.2d at 952, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 335 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
The purpose of the tax in question is to generate within the geographical
boundaries of Los Angeles County revenues for the improvement of public transit
within that locale. Such a tax is a substitute for those revenues which could other-
wise have been generated by real property taxes imposed by Los Angeles County
itself butfor the restrictions of Article XIII A.
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ices.' 6 7 The result would be that section 4 would apply to almost all
taxes, since most government functions could conceivably be funded by
the property tax.
Although Justice Richardson's interpretation of section 4 is indeed
liberal, it poses the question whether such a liberal interpretation actu-
ally serves the identified purpose of effective real property tax relief.
One conclusion is that Justice Richardson believes that the only way to
achieve effective property tax relief is by means of total tax relief.
Therefore, it is immaterial whether Justice Richardson believed the
purpose of Proposition 13 to be total tax relief or effective property tax
relief. Whatever the reasoning employed to reach his conclusion, that
conclusion was the same: section 4 applies to the LACTC sales tax.
B. Appropriateness of the Rule of Construction
If the plurality had limited its discussion to an interpretation of
section 4 without insisting on the use of a rule of strict construction,
Richmond might well have been a five to one majority opinion con-
cerned with the concept of "replacement." Replacement of lost prop-
erty tax, however, was not the test for section 4 which emerged from
Richmond."8 The rule of strict construction established by the plural-
167. Justice Richardson was concerned that "special districts" not empowered to levy
property taxes would be established to perform functions which the cities and counties had
funded before Proposition 13. Id But it should be noted that the LACTC was in existence
at the time Proposition 13 was passed. It was not set up suddenly to replace a city supported
transportation system. LACTC was not part of the property tax bill which, arguably, was
the cause of Proposition 13's passage.
168. "Replacement of lost property tax," however, may not be an effective test by itself in
that it is an elusive phrase, much as the phrase "effective real property tax relief." The test
would demand a case-by-case inquiry whether a particular tax in a particular locality re-
placed lost property taxes. In Richmond, the inquiry would not have been difficult because
the LACTC had never levied a property tax; therefore, it had no lost property tax revenues
to replace. At the other end of the spectrum, the determination would also be relatively
simple. A special district, such as a rural fire district, which levied only a property tax iden-
tified on the tax bill as a tax for that special district would clearly be replacing lost property
tax revenues if it levied another type of tax. But in between these extremes fall the local
governments which levy a variety of taxes, including property tax. If the property taxes were
levied for a specific purpose (for example, the City of Redondo Beach levied property taxes
for the city pension fund, the recreation program and the libraries; the taxes were so identi-
fied on the property tax bill), it would again be easy to conclude that taxes levied to support
these functions after Proposition 13 would be replacing lost property tax funds. In the more
typical case, however, property taxes are levied in the entity's name alone and go into the
local entity's general fund along with other tax revenues, the fund being disbursed to pay for
local activities. See, e.g., CITY OF MANHATTAN BEACH, ANNUAL BUDGET 1977-1978, 6-7,
54. Under these circumstances, the concept of replacement becomes more difficult. The
reasoning of Richmond may force the circular conclusion that any tax which goes into the
LOYOL OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17
ity is the decisive factor, and carries overriding significance for the
future.
Both the plurality169 and the dissent 70 cited the Amador rules of
construction which suggest that an initiative should be liberally con-
strued.'7  Those rules are firmly grounded in the decisions of the Cali-
fornia courts.172 The argument in favor of the traditional rule of liberal
construction and against the shift to stricter construction adopted in
Richmond is further supported by a general consideration of the history
and purpose of direct legislation 73 in California as well as the specific
experience of Proposition 13.
entity's general fund after Proposition 13 is replacing lost property taxes because property
tax revenues go into the general fund.
169. 31 Cal. 3d at 202-03, 643 P.2d at 944, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
170. Id at 210-11, 643 P.2d at 949, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 332 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
171. Neither Justice Mosk nor Justice Richardson mentioned the rule of construction
used in Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan, 27 Cal. 3d 855, 616 P.2d 802, 167 Cal. Rptr. 820
(1980), another Proposition 13 interpretation case. In Lonergan, Justice Mosk harmonized
two constitutional provisions to allow both vitality. Id at 866, 616 P.2d at 808-09, 167 Cal.
Rptr. at 826-27 (citing Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1973) for the proposition that a constitutional amendment is to be construed in harmony
with the existing framework of which it forms a part, so as to avoid a conflict).
Although harmonization in Richmond would require a finding of some constitutional
basis for local control over local taxes unfettered by state voters, see infra notes 193-99 and
accompanying text, the result would perhaps be more tailored to the voters intent, which was
effective property tax relief. The rule of liberal construction as applied by Justice Richard-
son results in total tax relief, in that section 4 would apply to all taxes. See supra text after
note 167. The rule of strict construction, however, at least as applied in City and County of
San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d 47, 648 P.2d 935, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713 (see infra text
accompanying notes 205-08), has the potential of making Proposition 13 an ineffective prop-
erty tax limitation initiative.
172. 22 Cal. 3d at 219, 244-45, 583 P.2d at 1283-84, 1299-1300, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 241-42,
257-58. The Amador court used two separate lines of cases as precedent for a rule of liberal
construction. The first line of cases deals with the power of the initiative and concluded that
the subject matter of an initiative may be virtually unlimited. Id at 219-20, 583 P.2d at
1283-84, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 241-42 (citing Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18
Cal. 3d 582, 598, 557 P.2d 473, 482, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 50 (1976); San Diego Bldg. Contrac-
tors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 210 n.3, 529 P.2d 570, 572-73 n.3, 118 Cal. Rptr.
146, 148-49 n.3 (1974)). The second line of cases deals with constitutional interpretation in
general but may be used to support a judicial procedure which first identifies the intent of
the voters and then liberally construes the words of the initiative so as to give maximum
effect to the voters' intent. 22 Cal. 3d at 245, 583 P.2d at 1299, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 257 (citing
Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 259, 502 P.2d 1049, 1056-57,
104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 769 (1972); In re Kernan, 242 Cal. App. 2d 488, 491, 51 Cal. Rptr. 515,
517 (1966)). See also supra note 127.
173. Direct legislation in California may be by initiative, referendum or recall. CAL.
CoNsT. art. II, §§ 8-19.
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1. The initiative process
The initiative process is spoken of in almost reverential terms, hav-
ing been described as the voice of the people and as democracy in ac-
tion.174 It has been characterized as a "battering ram" that enables
voters to enact legislation when the legislature cannot or will not do
so."' Yet the initiative process has not escaped criticism.
One criticism of the process is that it lacks a proposal review
mechanism comparable to the process of debate, alteration and consen-
sus which occurs when the legislature considers proposals.'76 The voter
contemplating an initiative, unlike the legislator, is limited to voting
"yes" or "no." There is no opportunity to shape, alter or affect the con-
tent of an initiative.
In the case of Proposition 13, a proposal review mechanism might
have resulted in clarification of the language of the initiative. Beyond
this, however, the criticism does not seem to apply to Proposition 13.
The voters considering the June 1978 ballot had a choice between two
property tax proposals-Proposition 13 and Proposition 8. Proposition
8,177 proposed by the legislature, had the advantage of legislative de-
bate and should, according to the theory underlying this criticism, have
represented a consensus. In the vote contest, however, it received fewer
votes than Proposition 13.178 Proposition 13 accomplished what the
legislature had failed to accomplish: a successful property tax reform
measure.
174. McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 332, 196 P.2d 787,788 (1948) ("The right of the
initiative is precious to the people and is one which the courts are zealous to preserve to the
fullest tenable measure of spirit as well as letter.").
175. V. KEY, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA 458 (1939). In the 1970s
there was strong public sentiment favoring property tax reform. Such reform, however, was
not forthcoming from the legislature. The last major legislative revision, Assembly Bill 80-
A Bill of Rights for Property Owners, was passed in 1966. See supra note 44 and accompa-
nying text. Leo McCarthy, Speaker of the Assembly, suggested in a debate with Howard
Jarvis, that it was the "threat of Proposition 13" that goaded the Legislature into proposing a
property tax reform bill which appeared as Proposition 8 on the 1978 ballot along with
Proposition 13. This effect was also noted in a newspaper story. As a storm rumbled over-
head during a debate one Senator asked, "'Is that thunder?' 'No, it's Jarvis,' another re-
sponded." L.A. Times, Mar. 3, 1978, § I, at 19, col. 2.
176. Comment, The Caiffornia Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform, 48 S. CAL. L.
REV. 922, 930-34 (1975). See also Initiative Makes a Big Comeback as Groups Seek to Bypass
Legislature, 3 CALIF. J. 229, 230 (1972).
177. CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, VOTER'S PAMPHLET 36 (June 1978). Proposition 8
would have permitted the Legislature to establish a lower property tax rate for owner occu-
pied homes.
178. CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE 39 (June 1978). Proposition 8
received 2.972,424 yes votes, 47% of the total vote cast on that proposition as opposed to
Proposition 13 which received 4,280,689 yes votes, 64.8% of the total vote. Id
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Another criticism of the initiative process is that voters often do
not have, or will not take, the time to investigate each proposition.
79
This criticism seems equally inapplicable to Proposition 13, which was
the subject of such widespread publicity and spirited public discussion
that theAmador court took judicial notice of the public's well-informed
status. 80 Consequently, lack of information upon which to base an
informed vote is not a valid ground for imposing a rule of strict con-
struction in the context of Proposition 13.
A final criticism which has been leveled at the initiative process is
that financing frequently determines the outcome of the election.'8"
However, of the sixteen initiatives that appeared on the ballot between
1972 and 1976, the better financed side prevailed only eight times.
82
Furthermore, this criticism seems inapplicable to the campaign for
Proposition 13, which was well financed on both sides. 8 3 Money sim-
ply was not an issue. Moreover, Proposition 13 stands out as a "grass-
roots" campaign. The Proposition 13 petition drive, which relied
primarily on volunteers to gather signatures, 8 4 was able to generate
two and one-half times the signatures needed to qualify the initiative
for the ballot. It would be error to urge a rule of strict construction of
Proposition 13 and its language on the theory that an undue infusion of
money had swayed the election.
The criticisms, then, which might be used to justify a strict inter-
pretation of an initiative do not apply to the specific experience of
Proposition 13. Voters turned out in record numbers for a primary
election, an election which traditionally has a low voter turnout. Given
the extent of the public debate and information, people were reason-
ably well informed. The electorate made a choice between two com-
peting proposals and Proposition 13 won.
179. See Comment, supra note 176, at 934-39.
180. 22 Cal. 3d at 231, 583 P.2d at 1291, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 249 ("We may take judicial
notice of the fact that the advance publicity and public discussion of article XIII A and its
predicted effects were massive.").
181. B. HYINK, POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN CALIFORNIA 130 (1975).
The most active organizations sponsoring or opposing ballot measures in recent
years have been well financed groups .... It would appear that the original pur-
pose of direct democracy, namely to eliminate control of government by powerful
economic interests has been frustrated.
Id
182. Lee, 750 Propositions: The Initiative in Perspective, 2 CALIFORNIA DATA BRIEF 3
(Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley, Apr. 1978).
183. By April 25, 1978, the proponents of Proposition 13 had raised $449,526; the oppo-
nents $887,153. By May 25, 1978, the proponents had raised $1,138,388; the opponents
$1,028,181. L.A. Times, May 31, 1978, § I, at 25, col. 1.
184. See supra note 59.
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2. The two-thirds vote requirement
The plurality based its rule of strict construction in part on the
inherently undemocratic nature of a two-thirds vote. Although a two-
thirds vote requirement is indeed burdensome, 185 this does not neces-
sarily constitute sufficient justification for abandonment of the tradi-
tionally applied rule of liberal construction. As onerous as the
requirement may be, it is neither unconstitutional nor a novelty in the
California Constitution.
86
In Westbrook v. Miha,,'87 the California Supreme Court consid-
ered a constitutional challenge to the requirement imposed by article
XVI, section 18 of the California Constitution that local indebtedness
be approved by two-thirds of the local voters. Two bond issues, one for
the San Francisco parks and recreation system and the other for school
facilities in the Hunters Point area of San Francisco, were approved by
a majority of the voters but failed to attain a two-thirds majority. Cit-
ing federal equal protection grounds, the California Supreme Court
held that the requirement of more than a simple majority was unconsti-
tutional. 188 The United States Supreme Court, however, in Gordon v.
Lance,'189 refused to extend the equal protection argument to a two-
thirds vote requirement, absent a showing that an identifiable class suf-
fered discrimination. 190
Despite the stamp of constitutionality placed on the two-thirds
vote requirement by the United States Supreme Court, a two-thirds
vote requirement may yet, based on the reasoning in Richmond, be-
come a trigger for strict construction of future initiatives in California.
185. See Scott & Hamilton, Extraordinary Majority Voting Requirements v. Equal Repre-
sentation: A Constitutional Challenge, 10 PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPORT 3 (Institute of Govern-
mental Studies, UC Berkeley, Aug. 1969). In a study of California school bond elections in
the period from 1966 to 1968, at least 80% of the bond issues received a 50% vote but only
40% received the two-thirds vote required to pass. Id at 3-4. A similar result was found in
Los Angeles and San Francisco city and county bond elections. Id at 4. See also supra
notes 92-93.
186. See, e.g., CAL. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 18 (two-thirds vote required to pass local bond
issues).
187. 2 Cal. 3d 765, 471 P.2d 487, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1979), vacated, 403 U.S. 915, cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971).
188. "We are aware of no principle which required the California Constitution to provide
that certain issues of local finance were to be entrusted to the voters. . . . Since it has done
so, however, the voting procedures established must comply with equal protection." Id at
784, 471 P.2d at 500, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 852 (citation omitted).
189. 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
190. "We conclude that so long as such provisions do not discriminate against or author-
ize discrimination against any identifiable class they do not violate the Equal Protection
Clause." 403 U.S. at 7.
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3. Local control
The plurality's justification for a rule of strict construction also
took into consideration the subject to which a two-thirds vote is to be
applied. In Richmond, Justice Mosk identified that subject as a local
tax-an issue of local effect and local concern.1 91 If applied to such a
local tax, section 4's two-thirds vote requirement, imposed by state vot-
ers, would interfere with strongly held principles of local control. The
dissent offered the counter argument that a two-thirds vote would pre-
serve local control. 192
The state constitution embodies the doctrine of local control. In
the allocation of power among the levels of government within the
state, some concerns belong to local governments.193 While the divid-
ing line between state and local affairs is somewhat fluid,' 94 the Rich-
191. 31 Cal. 3d at 204, 643 P.2d at 944, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
[By the terms of Proposition 13] a majority-but less than two-thirds--of the
voters statewide have determined in a local election involving a matter of primarily
local interest, a minority of voters can preclude the majority from imposing a "spe-
cial tax" confined to the taxpayers of the local entity to finance local projects or
services.
Id
192. "As we stressed in Amador, the 'super-majority' two-thirds vote requirement for
'special taxes' is defensible largely as thepreserver of home rule principles." Id at 217, 643
P.2d at 953, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 335 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citing
Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 226, 583 P.2d at 1287, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 245: "Although the interpre-
tation of [sections 1, 2 and 4] is not presently before us, it seems evident that section 4 assists
in preserving home rule principles by leaving to local voters the decision whether or not to
authorize 'special' taxes to support local programs." (emphasis in original)). Assuming for
the sake of argument that this is the import of the Amador passage cited by Justice Richard-
son, it is difficult to see how a local decision made by local voters will be anymore protected
from outsiders by requiring a two-thirds vote rather than a simple majority vote. Closer
analysis would suggest that a two-thirds vote imposed by outsiders is an intrusion into the
local decision on what the requisite voting majority for local issues should be.
193. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that the city governed
thereunder may make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to mu-
nicipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limitations provided in their several
charters and in respect to other matters they shall be subject to general laws.
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7 provides: "A county or city may make and enforce within its
limits all local, police, sanitary and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with
general laws."
The 1896 amendments which inserted what is now article XI, sections 5(a) and 7 into
the constitution, were enacted upon the principle "that the municipality itself knew better
what it wanted and needed than did the state at large, and to give that municipality the
exclusive privilege and right to enact direct legislation which would carry out and satisfy its
wants and needs." Exparte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 209, 74 P. 780, 782 (1903) (quoting Fragley
v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, 387, 58 P. 923, 923 (1899)).
194. See Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 63, 460 P.2d 137, 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465,
469 (1969) ("[Tlhe 'constitutional concept of municipal affairs. . . changes with the chang-
ing conditions upon which it is to operate. What may at one time have been a matter of
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mond plurality suggested that a sales tax for local transportation was a
matter of local concern. 95  California decisions support this
proposition. 196
The power to raise revenue is vital to local government.'97 In a
line of California cases concerning state statutes which appeared to
conflict with the authority of local governments to raise taxes for local
purposes, the statutes have been strictly construed to limit state-im-
posed restraints on local taxing power.' 98 These cases offer support for
a rule of strict construction where state voters impede the ability of
local entities to raise local taxes.
Yet, both the constitutional local control provisions and the cases
construing them are directed at the legislature, not the voters of the
state. It is undeniable that through the broad, almost unlimited reach
of the initiative power, state voters have the legal right to limit the reve-
nue raising power of local governments. 199 The plurality's local control
argument, therefore, of necessity, went beyond the issue of constitu-
tionality to inquire whether to effect the voters' intent of effective real
property tax relief, all local taxes must be limited by the two-thirds vote
requirement.2 °°
In conducting this inquiry, the plurality questioned thefairness of
section 4's two-thirds requirement in light of the fact that less than a
two-thirds majority of the state's voters had voted to pass Proposition
local concern may at a later time become a matter of state concern controlled by the general
laws of the state."' (citation omitted)); David, Our Caifornia Constitutions, Retrospections in
This Bicentennial Year, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 697, 731-32 (1976) ("What constitutes a
'municipal affair' at any given time or in any given circumstance is a judicial question."
(footnote omitted)).
195. 31 Cal. 3d at 204, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
196. See Weekes v. City of Oakland, 21 Cal. 3d 386, 392, 579 P.2d 449, 452, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 558, 561 (1978) ("[T]he power to tax for local purposes clearly is one of the privileges
accorded chartered cities by the home rule provision of the California Constitution."); Ex
parle Braun, 141 Cal. at 211-12, 74 P. at 783.
197. Exparte Braun, 141 Cal. at 209, 74 P. at 782 (" 'A municipality without the power of
taxation would be a body without life, incapable of acting, and serving no useful purpose.'
(quoting United States v. New Orleans, 98 U.S. 381, 393 (1878))).
198. See Weekes v. City of Oakland, 21 Cal. 3d 386, 579 P.2d 449, 146 Cal. Rptr. 558
(1978) (license fee not tax on income as prohibited by CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17041.5);
Rivera v. City of Fresno, 6 Cal. 3d 132, 490 P.2d 793, 98 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1971) (utility users
tax substantially different from sales and use tax of CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 7203.5). See
also David, Caifornia Cities and the Constitution of 1879, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 688-
89 (1980). But f Century Plaza Hotel Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 7 Cal. App. 3d 616, 87
Cal. Rptr. 166 (1970) (taxation and regulation of alcohol a state concern).
199. See San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 210 n.3, 529
P.2d 570, 572 n.3, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148 n.3 (1974) (power of initiative construed to be
limited only by constitutional provisions).
200. 31 Cal. 3d at 205, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
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13. Justice Mosk raised the spectre of a local entity unable to pass a
local tax to pay for a purely local purpose because of section 4's restric-
tion.2 ' A rule of strict construction is necessary, he reasoned, in part to
prevent state voters from running local governments. 0 2 Absent such a
rule, local voters would have no remedy but to launch their own state-
wide initiative to amend Proposition 13, an almost unmanageable op-
tion by any standards, and even more impractical if the local voters
were seeking the change for some local issue with no statewide appeal.
Section 4 need not be construed to apply to all taxes raised by all
local entities in order to give effect to the intent of the voters. It applies,
as both the plurality and the concurrence argued, only to those taxes
designed to replace lost property tax revenues.20 3 The plurality decided
that LACTC's sales tax was not designed to replace lost property taxes;
therefore, the tax simply did not fit within the two-thirds vote require-
ment of section 4. Consequently, there was no reason to construe sec-
tion 4 either liberally or strictly. The plurality's rule of strict
construction, therefore, was not necessary to the resolution of
Richmond.
4. The effect of a rule of strict construction
The plurality's rule of strict construction moots any discussion of
the voters' intent; more to the point, it totally ignores the "replacement
of lost property taxes" test of section 4 which seemed to have been de-
veloped in Richmond. Indeed, the ultimate effect of the rule of strict
construction which emerged in Richmond may be to deprive section 4
201. Id at 204, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
202. Id at 205, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328. The plurality's discussion clearly
goes beyond the facts of Richmond. Justice Mosk was concerned with the voters of an area
where the majority of the voters had voted against Proposition 13. Cf. City and County of
San Francisco v. Farrell, infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text. He sensed something
inherently unfair in imposing upon them the two-thirds vote requirement of section 4 when
they are voting on issues of only local concern. See 31 Cal. 3d at 203, 643 P.2d at 945, 182
Cal. Rptr. at 328. While such an argument may be valid, it is not applicable to the facts of
Richmond.
Although Proposition 13 passed with 64% approval statewide, it received 67% of the
vote in Los Angeles County. CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE 39 (June
1978) (1,367,907 votes for, 662,817 votes against in Los Angeles County). More than two-
thirds of the voters were seemingly willing to impose upon themselves, as well as on the rest
of the state, the requirement for a two-thirds vote in local special tax elections. It certainly
was not unfair, then, to the voters of Los Angeles County to say that 54% approval, which
the LACTC sales tax received, was not enough.
203. 31 Cal. 3d at 205-06, 643 P.2d at 946, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 329; id at 209-10, 643 P.2d at
948, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 331 (Kaus. J., concurring).
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of its vitality.2 4
This theory is given substance in City and County of San Francisco
v. Farrell,"' decided three months after Richmond. Only 47% of the
voters of San Francisco had voted for Proposition 13; yet 55% had
voted for an extension of a tax on payrolls and gross receipts. Both the
payroll and gross receipts tax and the property tax were deposited into
the city's general fund, which was the source of revenue for general city
functions. Farrell, the city controller, refused to certify that funds were
available from the tax to pay for improvements to a municipally owned
hospital. He asserted that the payroll and gross receipts tax was a spe-
cial tax subject to section 4's two-thirds vote requirement, and that 55%
voter approval was an insufficient vote.2 °6 If the test to be applied were
"any tax used to replace lost property tax revenues," as discussed in
Richmond, the extension of the payroll tax could well have been
viewed as a "special tax" and subject to the two-thirds vote require-
ment. The Farrell majority, however, using the rule of strict construc-
tion established in Richmond, construed the term "special taxes"
narrowly. It concluded that special taxes were only those taxes levied
for specific purposes.20 7 Because the Farrell tax was intended for the
general fund, not for a special purpose, it was not a special tax and
therefore not limited by section 4.208
The Farrell majority ignored the statements of section 4's purpose
articulated in both Amador and Richmond: that it was part of the Prop-
osition 13 package to insure effective real property tax relief. Under
the Farrell holding, a tax raised for a specific purpose must be ap-
proved by two-thirds of the voters regardless of whether it replaces lost
property taxes. By the same token, a tax levied for the general fund,
which replaces lost property tax revenues, does not require a two-thirds
vote, regardless of the fact that money from the general fund will be
204. For an example of this, see Feldman, Community Tries Innovative Tax Strategy, L.A.
Times, Oct. 30, 1983, § II, at 1, col. 3. An initiative on the Palos Verdes Estates local ballot
provided for an annual flat property tax of $485. City officials maintained that a simple
majority of the voters would be sufficient to approve the initiative because "the income from
the tax would be placed into the city's general fund." Id But, while some of Proposition
13's vitality may be lost due to Richmond, it still is arguable that the goal of effective real
property tax relief has not been defeated. Voters are able to defeat property tax measures
requiring a 50% vote. Cf. L.A. Times, Nov. 9, 1983, § II, at 4, col. 6 (Palos Verdes initiative
received only 43% of the vote).
205. 32 Cal. 3d 47, 648 P.2d 935, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1982).
206. Id at 50-51, 648 P.2d at 936-37, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15.
207. Id at 57, 648 P.2d at 940, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
208. Id
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used to support a specific activity. Farrell exalts the form of section 4
over its substance.
While the definition of "special districts" developed in Rich-
mond-a district empowered to levy a property tax-is not inconsistent
with the Proposition 13 goal of "effective real property tax relief," the
rule of strict construction has the potential to undercut sharply Proposi-
tion 13's effectiveness as a property tax relief measure. As applied in
Farrell, the rule of strict construction neutralizes the effect of section 4.
The goal of effective real property tax relief may well be lost if the term
''special taxes" is read so as to refer only to taxes levied for a specific
purpose. Local entities may be expected to levy all taxes for the gen-
eral fund, as most taxes are presently levied, to avoid the two-thirds
vote requirement. The property tax relief won in sections 1 and 2 may
indeed be taxed away as local entities simply substitute one tax source
for another.
C The Court's Role in Initiative Interpretation
A former Hollywood starlet, in a paid political announcement, ad-
vised voters to vote against three Supreme Court Justices in the No-
vember 1982 election because, among other things, "they have taken
Proposition 13 away from us."'20 9 While there may be voter dissatisfac-
tion with the results the court has reached in interpreting Proposition
13 cases, the more interesting discussion in light of the Richmond deci-
sion focuses not on the result of the decision but on the role of the court
in initiative interpretation cases. Has the court, after Richmond, set
itself up as the "supervoter?"
The Amador decision opened with the statement that "[w]e do not
consider or weigh the economic or social wisdom or general propriety
of the initiative. Rather, our sole function is to evaluate article XIII A
legally in the light of established constitutional standards. ' 210 Justice
Richardson, dissenting in Richmond, specifically made the point for
section 4: "Whether or not it is financially wise to do so, the people,
through their Constitution, have a legal right to so limit the revenue
powers of local government. 211
This is hardly the first time that a discussion of the court's role has
arisen. To paraphrase Justice Holmes, dissenting in Lochner v. New
209. June Allyson (Paid Political Announcement) KFAC 92.6 (Los Angeles), Oct. 27,
1982. See also supra note 68.
210. 22 Cal. 3d at 219, 583 P.2d at 1283, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
211. 31 Cal. 3d at 210, 643 P.2d at 949, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 332 (Richardson, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
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York,2 12 the court should not strictly construe an initiative simply be-
cause the court does not like it.213 The majority in United States v.
Carolene Products, Co. 214 was willing to defer to the legislature. The
Court has maintained this stand. In Ferguson v. Skrupa,2 15 the Court
stated: "We refuse to sit as a 'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of
legislation .. ,216
The character and purpose of the initiative process itself,21 7 as well
as previous California decisions that have established a rule of liberal
construction,21 8 suggest that once the voters' intent is discerned, the
language of the initiative should be liberally interpreted to give the vot-
ers' intent the fullest effect.219 The initiative process is direct legisla-
212. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The Lochner majority struck down New
York State maximum hour legislation under the due process clause, explaining that "the
freedom of master and employe[e] to contract with each other and in relation to their em-
ployment, and in defining the same, cannot be prohibited or interfered with, without violat-
ing the Federal Constitution." Id at 64. Commentators have argued that the result flowed
from the justices' belief that the Court's role was to protect the free enterprise system consis-
tent with the concept of laissez-faire economics. See, e.g., R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN
SUPREME COURT 137-39 (1960).
213. 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes stated:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country
does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should
desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I do not con-
ceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagree-
ment has nothing to do with the right of the majority to embody their opinions in
law.
Id
214. 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (challenge to legislation prohibiting interstate shipment of
"filled milk" with the Court deferring to legislative judgment: "[W]here the legislative judg-
ment is drawn in question, [the inquiry] must be restricted to the issue whether any state of
facts is known, or which could reasonably be assumed, which affords support for the
[legislation].")
215. 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (sustaining a Kansas law prohibiting a "debt adjustment busi-
ness" unless incident to the practice of law).
216. Id at 731.
217. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
219. Justice Richardson did not carefully go through the two-step process. His opinion
uses language from Amador which cites two different goals of Proposition 13: effective real
property tax relief and tax relief, tax relief being a much broader goal. See supra notes 104-
05. If he chose tax relief as the goal because it was the more liberal interpretation, he ap-
plied a rule of liberal interpretation too soon. See supra text accompanying note 162. The
essential first step determination is the voters' intent. See supra notes 127, 172 and accompa-
nying text. Then the court should apply a rule of liberal construction to the initiative to give
the fullest effect to that intent. Stare decisis does not suggest that a rule of liberal construc-
tion be used to discern voters' intent. Justice Richardson could himself be playing
supervoter by making Proposition 13 broader than the voters' intent. See supra text accom-
panying notes 162-64. A similar discussion was advanced by Raoul Berger in Government by
Judiciary: the Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1977). Berger argued that the
Court's role is to determine the constitutionality of law, not to make law. The power to
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
tion, a mechanism by which the state voters can implement legislation
which the legislature cannot or will not enact. Once the court deter-
mines that the action is constitutional, a strong argument can be made
that the court should no more interfere with the intent of the voters
than it would interfere with the intent of the legislature. Admittedly
the court had before it the predictions of Proposition 13's detractors:
that it would bring local government to a grinding halt and completely
eliminate all public services.220 Once the plurality acknowledged, how-
ever, the constitutionality of the two-thirds vote requirement 22' without
choosing to explore the possibility of a constitutional conflict between
Proposition 13 and the local control provisions of the California Con-
stitution,222 the choice to limit Proposition 13 belonged to the Califor-
nia voters, not the California Supreme Court.223
On the other hand, the California initiative process itself may jus-
tify a more expansive role for the court than simply "evaluat[ing] arti-
cle XIII A legally in the light of established constitutional
standards. 224 It is also conceivable that the court could adopt such a
role without totally abrogating the intent of the voters.
Proposition 13 can be altered only by another initiative225 or by
the judiciary. The court in Westbrook v. Mihaly226 stated, however,
that the existence of a process for amendment by the voters should not
preclude court action.227 While Westbrook was vacated on other
amend the Constitution remains in the United States voters. If the voters wish to expand the
fourteenth amendment, they can vote to do so. It is not the Court's province to expand the
fourteenth amendment beyond the intent of the voters who voted for the amendment.
220. See supra note 65.
221. 31 Cal. 3d at 203, 643 P.2d at 944, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
222. Id at 204, 643 P.2d at 945, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 328. See also supra note 171.
223. The County Supervisors Association of California attempted to qualify an initiative
for the statewide ballot which would give local governments limited power to raise property
taxes with a two-thirds voter approval and to raise other taxes with the approval of a simple
majority vote, specifically amending section 4. Local Funding Plan Pushed, L.A. Times, Feb.
1, 1983, § II, at 1, col. 4.
224. 22 Cal. 3d at 219, 583 P.2d at 1283, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
225. CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 10(c) provides in pertinent part: "[The legislature] may
amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute which becomes effective only when
approved by the electors unless the initiative statute provides amendment or repeal without
their approval."
226. 2 Cal. 3d 765, 471 P.2d 487, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1970), vacated sub nom. Mihlay v.
Westbrook, 403 U.S. 915, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971).
227. While the state as a whole has the remedy of an initiative amendment, this does not
mean that this remedy is realistically available to a local group trying to overcome a state-
wide initiative. In Westbrook, the court stated that "the fact that a majority of the voters of
the State of California may have a practically available political remedy does not mean that
petitioners or the voters of San Francisco [who represent only a small minority of the voters
in the state] have one." Id at 796 n.61, 471 P.2d at 509 n.61, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 861 n.61.
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grounds, 228 the court's observation, when considered in light of Justice
Stone's famous footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co. 229
suggests that a court may be justified in interfering when the political
process itself can provide no relief.
230
It has been suggested that one role of the courts may be that of
"unclogging" the political process.231 The political process may well be
blocked by Proposition 13, both by its imposition of the two-thirds vote
requirement on local tax votes and by the necessity, imposed by the
initiative process, for a statewide initiative to amend Proposition 13
even as it applies to local issues. Richmond's discussion of the inherent
unfairness of the two-thirds vote requirement, particularly when it is
imposed by state voters upon essentially local tax matters, supports the
conclusion that the court's role should be something more than simply
interpreting the constitutionality of Proposition 13.
Yet the court, in pursuing such an expanded role, should limit its
actions so as to respect the intent of the voters in passing Proposition
13. The Farrell court, for instance, could have concluded that local
taxes which do not replace lost property taxes do not require a two-
thirds vote. This would have been an interpretation of section 4 consis-
tent with the Proposition 13 goal of effective real property tax relief; at
the same time, it is not so strict a construction that local voters would
be forced to undertake a statewide initiative campaign to overcome
Proposition 13 before they could approve a local tax with less than a
two-thirds vote. The Farrell court, however, not only went beyond the
role of constitutional interpreter, but entered as well the realm of
"supervoter" by defining special taxes in a manner that had no rela-
tionship to the voters' intent in passing Proposition 13. The rule of
strict construction established in Richmond can have a Draconian effect
on Proposition 13.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Richmond court concluded that the LACTC was not a "spe-
cial district" within the meaning of section 4 because it had no author-
ity to levy a property tax and therefore could not replace lost property
228. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
229. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
230. Justice Stone's footnote actually says he reserved judgment. "It is unnecessary to
consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordina-
rily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation is to be subjected to more
exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than
are most other types of legislation." Id
231. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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tax revenues. Yet, in light of the Farrell court's ability to further limit
the scope of Proposition 13 using the rule of construction established in
Richmond, this definition of "special districts" would appear to be of
almost minor significance.
The primary importance of Richmond lies in the rule of strict con-
struction established by the decision. The use of the initiative is again
rising in California as well as the nation. Richmond constitutes prece-
dent for imposing a rule of strict construction on any future initiative.
The role of the court thus appears to be expanding; the court may be
taking the initiative.
Katherine Helen Bower
